This agreement was signed between Egypt and Great Britain, which represented Uganda, Kenya, Tanganjika (now Tanzania) and Sudan. The document gave Cairo the right to veto higher projects on the Nile that would affect its share of water. A joint decision to allow more time for a joint agreement between the heads of state and government of Egypt, Ethiopia and Sudan. The agreement is expected to pave the way for continued diplomatic cooperation. Fundamental principles of the agreement include prioritizing downstream countries for electricity generated by electricity generated by the dam, a dispute resolution mechanism and compensation for damages. In May 2010, five upstream states signed an agreement to seek more water from the Nile, a step that was firmly rejected by Egypt and Sudan. [5] The Framework Cooperation Agreement (CFA) negotiated for years under the NBI was to be signed for a period of one year. [19] Ethiopia, Kenya, Uganda, Rwanda, Burundi and Tanzania signed the agreement; Ethiopia ratified it in 2013. [20] The DRC should also be signed, while Egypt and Sudan are not supposed to. An Egyptian government spokesman said in May 2010 that “Egypt will not accede to an agreement or sign any agreement on its share.” [5] Nearly two decades after its creation, the Nile Basin Initiative (NBI) transition mechanism has been attributed to the fact that it fulfills several components of its institutional project – and that it has created an atmosphere of trust and dialogue between the neighbouring countries. Nevertheless, the negotiations under the aegis of the NBI have not fulfilled one of the Organization`s most fundamental tasks: the establishment of a permanent legal framework and an “acceptable” institution for all States throughout the basin. The diplomatic undertaking that led to the adoption of the Watershed Cooperation Framework (CFA) agreement faced many challenges. I affirm that, despite the unprecedented summits in cooperative dialogues, widely presented as a “political triumph” from the point of view of the upstream, the legal and hydropolitical discourse that led to the final organization of the CFA has not allayed the “expectations” of two major states on stilts: Egypt and Sudan.

This was an existential threat to the institutional future of the NBI itself and to the noble goals it sought to achieve. Nevertheless, the organizational situation of the basin has also shown that the countries bordering the Nile have little choice but to revive the “declining” dynamic and ensure that the NBI`s commitment is concluded in an “inclusive” and “fair” manner. Otherwise, according to the author, the alternative would not only represent a bleak future in terms of cooperation and optimal development of the Nile`s resources, but would also stifle the persistent river interests of the basin countries. The text of the Framework Cooperation Agreement (CFA) sets out principles, rights and obligations for cooperative management and development of water resources in the Nile basin. Instead of quantifying “fair rights” or water use responsibilities, the treaty aims to “promote integrated management, sustainable development and harmonious exploitation of the basin`s water resources, as well as their conservation and protection for current and future generations.”